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Abstract 
The issue considered in this study is whether objective, official reports on 
disability status are reliable. While there is a rather large literature on the 
reliability of self-reported disability, evidence regarding objective data is scant. 
It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since individuals out 
of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have 
official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies. But we argue that 
such administrative data should be regarded with some suspicion, since the 
administrators also may have incentives to misreport. The empirical evidence, 
based on a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, suggests systematic 
misreporting by the Public Employment Service of objective, official disability 
measures due to incentives to exaggerate disability.  
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Surveys indicate that the prevalence of disability in the working-age population 
is far from negligible in industrialised countries. On average, 14 per cent of 
those aged 20–64 regarded themselves as being disabled in the OECD 
countries in the late 1990’s (OECD, 2003). The number of disability benefit 
recipients is also substantial, about 6 per cent. Since very few disability benefit 
recipients ever return to the labour market, public budgets have been put under 
pressure in many countries. This is highlighted by the fact that, among the non-
employed in OECD countries, disability benefits are much more widespread 
than unemployment benefits.
1  
Yet there is no consensus on what disability means. Disability is notoriously 
difficult to measure and conceptions may be influenced by, e.g., ambiguity in 
clinical judgements and changing social values (see, e.g., Marin, 2003). Not 
surprisingly, there is a substantial literature on the validity of various health 
measures and the distinction between “subjective”, i.e., self-reported, and more 
“objective” information, based on administrative sources, like mortality data or 
medical reports.
2 Throughout this paper we will follow the literature and use 
the term “objective” for disability information based on administrative sources. 
However, as we will show, objectivity in this sense does not guarantee 
reliability.  
According to the literature, both subjective and objective disability may be 
reported with error. Subjective data may be biased due to a variety of reasons – 
responses being dependent on labour market outcomes one wishes to explain, 
justification of current or anticipated non-employment status or financial 
incentives to report a disability. In addition, both subjective and objective 
measures may contain non-systematic classification errors (“non-differential” 
errors in the terminology of Bound et al., 2001). For example, subjective health 
status may not be entirely comparable across respondents due to unobserved 
personal traits. Although more objective measures are commonly assumed to 
be less biased, they may be contaminated by non-systematic differential errors. 
                                                      
1 In 1999, 23 per cent of the non-employed received disability-related benefits, while 16 per cent 
were recipients of unemployment benefits (OECD, 2003).  
2 See, e.g., Aarts and de Jong (1992), Baker et al. (2004), Benitez-Silva et al., (1999, 2003, 
2004), Bound (1991), Bound et al. (2001), Kerkhofs et al. (1999), Kreider (1999), Kreider and 
Pepper (2002, 2003), Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995) and Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2003).   4 
In particular, it has been pointed out that the fact that objective measures rarely 
consider work capacity introduces non-systematic error.   
The validity of various health measures has important implications for 
econometric work on many policy-relevant issues. For example, if the purpose 
is to  estimate the impact of the generosity of disability benefits on the 
probability of being awarded disability pension, it is common practice to 
include a measure of health in the regression in order to obtain an unbiased 
estimate of the effect of benefit generosity. However, the bias does not 
necessarily disappear; using a self-reported measure can either over- or 
underestimate the effect and an objective measure, not perfectly correlated with 
work capacity, leads to a downward bias with standard regression methods 
(Bound et al., 2001). One might think that the availability of more objective 
health measures based on work capacity would help researchers to overcome 
some of these econometric concerns.  
In this study, we consider the validity of a particular objective measure of 
health status, namely disability data for individuals registered at the Swedish 
Public Employment Service (PES).
3 This objective, official measure, culled 
from the HÄNDEL events database of the National Labour Market Board over 
the period 1996–2001, actually takes work capacity into account. The validity 
of such a work-related objective measure has, to the best of our knowledge, not 
been examined in the previous literature. Every person registered with the 
public employment service (PES) in Sweden is classified according to work 
disability status in the events database. The classification is used by the PES 
officials in order to facilitate placement of unemployed persons in various 
labour market programmes for the work disabled. We contrast the PES data to 
contemporaneous, self-reported data on disability for the same individuals, 
extracted from the Labour Force Surveys (LFS), in order to explore the validity 
of the objective information. We argue that the objective measure may be 
biased, contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, although the information 
is based on an assessment of work capacity and is not self-reported.  
Our concern for a flawed objective measure arises from the observation that 
there are incentives for disability classification errors, both among the PES 
officials and the jobseekers, who could attempt to influence the PES officials’ 
decisions. One can think of several reasons for such errors to occur. First, PES 
                                                      
3 Sweden is among the countries with the highest disability prevalence, the highest expenditures 




officials may have incentives for classifying healthy individuals as disabled due 
to various quantitative targets. There are such targets with the respect to the 
placement of disabled workers in subsidised jobs as well as regarding the 
placement of unemployed workers in regular jobs. The latter goal can be more 
easily achieved by placing individuals with low qualifications in subsidised 
jobs for disabled workers. A classification as disabled is necessary for access to 
labour market programmes targeted to the disabled, such as subsidised 
employment and sheltered employment. Second, funding to the PES offices 
increases in the caseload of disabled jobseekers. Third, a disability 
classification may represent an attractive option also for non-disabled 
jobseekers, due to the reduced work pace and secure employment that 
characterise many jobs for the disabled.  
In order to assess the validity of the objective disability classification, we 
investigate whether the individual’s unemployment contributes to him or her 
being classified as disabled by the PES office. Given “true” disability status, 
this should not be the case. However, we cannot observe true health and using 
subjective health as a proxy for true disability status may be problematic for 
reasons discussed above. But if we find that the difference in the categorical 
disability classification between the PES and the self-reported LFS increases in 
accumulated unemployment of the individual, we interpret this as evidence of 
bias in the objective disability classification (resulting from behaviour on part 
of the PES officials or jobseekers). The method of differencing relies on weak 
identifying assumptions. We allow for the possibilities of reverse causality 
(unemployment affecting health), non-transportability of data (different 
thresholds applying for classifications as work disabled in the PES and LFS) 
and regarding influence of non-health considerations on the individuals’ own 
assessment of health status.  
We find that the likelihood that an individual is classified as disabled in the 
PES data, but not in the LFS, increases in accumulated months of 
unemployment, even after controlling for other individual characteristics. This 
result indicates systematic misreporting in the objective data and is consistent 
with the view that PES officials and jobseekers have incentives to exaggerate 
disability.  
Our study differs from previous analyses of the reliability of health 
measures. In earlier work, the focus is mostly on the evaluation of self-assessed 
measures. It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since 
individuals out of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be   6 
best to have official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies (like 
the Disability Insurance (DI) administration or the PES). The source of 
misreporting we identify is similar to the moral hazard effect discussed in the 
literature on DI and other types of social insurance.
4 However, the potential for 
moral hazard in the provision of labour market programmes for the disabled 
(which also can be regarded as a form of DI) seems not to have been 
considered before in the literature. 
Our results can be contrasted to those of Benitez-Silva et al. (2004), who 
also compare objective, official data on disability with self-reports. Under the 
maintained assumption that official data are correct, the hypothesis that self-
assessed health is an unbiased indicator of the Disability Insurance 
Administration’s award decisions in the U.S. cannot be rejected. Here, we 
come to a rather different conclusion regarding the validity of the objective 
data, since unemployment increases the probability of an official classification 
as disabled. Another related study is Baker et al. (2004), where medical reports 
are used as the benchmark and related to objective, self-reported measures, i.e., 
survey reports of the incidence of chronic ailments. The evidence indicates that 
the latter are measured with considerable error. Like our study, Cullen (2003) 
raises the issue whether objective data on disability are reliable, but in a 
different context. She argues that school districts in the U.S. have financial 
incentives to classify students as disabled. The results suggest that disability 
rates increase in the generosity of reimbursements.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, while the 
econometric framework is spelled out in Section 3. The results from the 
estimations are presented in Section 4 and a conclusion is given in Section 5. 
 
 
2  The data  
 
This study uses individual-level data matched from two sources: The HÄNDEL 
events database from the Public Employment Service offices (PES), compiled 
by the National Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen), and the 
                                                      
4 For empirical studies on moral hazard in social insurance, see, e.g., Gruber and Kubik (1997) 
for U.S. disability insurance, Larsson (2004) and Johansson and Palme, (2005) for Swedish 




Labour Force Surveys (LFS), of Statistics Sweden. Before proceeding to a 
more detailed description of the sample, we discuss how work disability is 
defined in the PES and the LFS data and the incentives associated with such 
classifications.  
 
2.1  Definitions and incentives in disability classifications  
The PES data contain information on the incidence and type of work disability, 
reported by the PES office and this is the objective, official measure of health 
we use. Our self-reported data originate from the LFS, where the respondents 
are asked whether they consider themselves disabled, and if so, whether the 
capacity to work is reduced. There are also questions about the type of 
disability. Thus for each individual in the sample we have one subjective and at 
least one objective observation on disability status. However, we have 
information on the severity of the disability only in the surveys. (Further details 
on the definitions of disability in the two sources are given in Appendix A.)  
Since the various problems associated with self-reported data on health have 
already been discussed extensively in the literature, we focus our attention on 
the reasons as to why the objective PES classifications may be biased. To this 
end, it is useful to consider objectives and administrative processes at the PES 
offices. These offices are part of the National Labour Market Administration 
(Arbetsmarknadsverket). Besides providing employment services, the PES 
offices make decisions about placements in active labour market programmes. 
Some of these programmes are designed exclusively for the work disabled. The 
two largest such programmes are subsidised employment (lönebidrag) and 
sheltered employment, of which Samhall, a state-owned company, is the main 
provider (Bergeskog, 2001). Subsidised employment engaged on average some 
50,000 participants in 1999, according to the National Labour Market Board. 
There were 33,000 workers in sheltered employment, of which the majority – 
over 80 per cent – were employed in Samhall. In addition, all traditional labour 
market programmes are open for the work disabled, and many of them 
participate in educational programmes.  
In an internal document, aimed at PES officials working with disabled 
jobseekers, the National Labour Market Board uses the following definition of 
occupational disability (Ams, 1999, p.2, in our translation): “An individual 
who, due to physical injury, brain damage/disorder or psychic vulnerability, 
has a somatic, psychic, intellectual or socio-medical impairment and has, or is 
expected to have, difficulties in getting or keeping gainful employment is   8 
considered to be work disabled…In order to provide those with work 
disabilities the same opportunities as other jobseekers there is the possibility of 
a disability coding. The coding makes it possible for persons with work 
disabilities to get access to specialised services and/or labour market 
programmes.” The document continues: “Remember that the jobseeker should 
agree with a registration as work disabled…If you are uncertain about the 
extent of the impairment you are advised to consult an expert, e.g., a physician, 
psychologist or social welfare officer” (Ams, 1999, p.5). 
A classification as work disabled is thus necessary for participation in a 
programme for the work disabled. Otherwise, the procedures regarding 
disability classifications are not strictly regulated, leaving some scope for the 
individual judgement of the PES officials (SOU 2003:95). If the jobseeker has 
a disability that is readily apparent to the PES official, or if a doctor’s 
certificate is presented by the jobseeker, the coding may take place at the 
beginning of the registration period. In most cases, though, the coding is likely 
to take some time. This may be due to administrative inertia, as the PES official 
collects information about the jobseeker and possibly arranges for a medical 
examination, which may involve some waiting time. It may also be the case 
that the coding is initiated in connection with a discussion of placement in a 
labour market programme for the disabled, which typically occurs only after a 
long period of registration.  
It is not unlikely that changes in labour market policy during the 1990’s 
have had repercussions on the coding of disability at the PES. In 1996, the 
Government introduced a goal to halve open unemployment by 2000. At the 
same time, target levels for the number of persons in labour market 
programmes were announced. These quantitative goals represent a substantial 
departure from the traditional policy, which allowed more freedom for the PES 
offices in the choice of measures for reducing unemployment.
5 It has been 
argued that the strong focus on the open-unemployment goal implies an 
                                                      
5In a questionnaire directed to employees at PES offices in 1996, nearly all of the 
respondents reported having quantitative goals, mostly formulated at the office level (Nyberg and 
Skedinger, 1998). About 90 per cent declared that the goals concerned the number of placements 
in active labour market programmes and over 60 per cent reported having goals specifically for 
the work disabled. Although few PES employees (around 15 per cent) stated that their own 
wages were linked to the fulfilment of the goals, a clear majority (60 – 80 per cent) reported that 
office funding was dependent on the performance in this respect. 




obvious risk that active labour market programmes mainly serve as a means of 
reducing open unemployment (Zetterberg, 1997).  
There are various quantitative targets that apply to programmes for the 
disabled. Thus officials at the PES offices may have incentives to classify 
healthy jobseekers as disabled. On the one hand, there are targets that should 
directly affect the number of individuals classified as disabled. On the other 
hand, there are targets that are likely to have indirect effects. The quantitative 
goals regarding placements in subsidised employment may be regarded as 
direct goals. During the period 1997–2002, the target volumes, which are 
specified as monthly averages and broken down by region, have increased from 
50,000 to at 59,000 individuals, according to the Government’s annual 
regulatory guidelines (regleringsbrev) for the National Labour Market 
Administration. There are also targets regarding the average level of 
subsidisation in these jobs. The targets have decreased from 60 to less than 58 
percent of total pay during the same period (the remainder being paid by the 
employer). Quantitative targets like these may put pressure on PES officials to 
lower the threshold for disability classifications, since this increases the supply 
of eligible workers and also makes employers more willing to accept a 
candidate for a subsidised job. The targets operating in a more indirect way 
concern placements of unemployed workers in regular jobs. These goals can be 
more easily achieved by placing individuals with low qualifications in 
subsidised jobs for disabled workers.  
Funding for subsidised employment is distributed according to “resource 
allocation models” (resursfördelningsmodeller). One model applies to 
allocation from the National Labour Market Board to the County Labour 
Boards (länsarbetsnämnder) and each board uses a model for allocation to the 
PES offices. Allocation to the PES offices – but not to the boards – is in part 
dependent on the caseload of disabled jobseekers. This may create incentives at 
the local level to classify healthy individuals as disabled. The allocation models 
have also been criticised by the Swedish Parliament for not creating incentives 
for the PES offices to help disabled individuals finding regular, or less 
subsidised, employment (Swedish Parliamentary Auditors, 2002/03:RR10).  
Healthy jobseekers may also have incentives to be classified as disabled, as 
such a classification is a requirement for placements in subsidised employment 
and these jobs may represent an attractive option. In sheltered employment, 
average wages are slightly lower than the industry average but higher than 
unemployment benefits. The reduced work pace may make effort-adjusted   10
wages attractive for more productive (and possibly non-disabled) workers 
(Haavisto et al., 1993). The presence of non-disabled employees in sheltered 
employment is documented in Skedinger and Widerstedt (2003). In addition, 
there is a high degree of employment security in sheltered employment, since 
employees are not laid off in response to declining demand as could be the case 
in a regular job. Thus there is a distinct possibility that such programmes are 
used for income support in ways not originally intended.  
The discussion above suggests that the objective, official measure of health 
we use may be biased for various reasons. There is also reason to believe that 
the classification errors are systematically related to unemployment. Next we 
turn to a description of the sample.  
 
2.2  The LFS and the PES data 
The LFS have been conducted by telephone each month since 1970. We use 
the surveys carried out during the third quarters in 1996, 1998 and 2000, which 
were supplemented with questions about health status.  The LFS samples are 
repeated random cross-sections of about 18,000 individuals in the resident 
population between 16 and 64 years of age. This data set has been matched 
with the PES data, which contains information about every individual 
registered at the PES offices. We have information about each spell in open 
unemployment and labour market programmes for the period 1991–2002, 
including background characteristics of the individuals, e.g., work disability. 
The matched data set can be regarded as a basically random sample of job-
seeking individuals registered at the PES offices in 1996, 1998 or 2000, but not 
as a random sample of individuals in general.   
A registration period in the PES data ends as the individual finds a regular 
job or leaves the labour force. An individual may have several such periods. 
The registration period may consist of a series of search category periods, in, 
e.g., open unemployment or a labour market programme. Work disability is 
registered at some point of time during a search period. Thus if an individual 
has many search periods, the disability classification may change during the 
registration period.  
Our sample consists of 53,736 individuals in total. For various reasons a 





6 The sample thus consists of individuals with PES spells during the 
period 1991 to 2002, who were also in 1996, 1998 or 2000 interviewed about 
health status in the LFS.
7  
Before turning to the sample characteristics in general, we focus on the PES 
and LFS measures of work disability. Figure 1 shows aggregate disability data, 
i.e., not our sample, for the period 1992–2002. The data include all individuals 
registered as jobseekers by the PES offices on October 15 each year and all 
individuals in the supplementary LFS every second year during 1996–2002, 
i.e., regardless of whether the individuals are included in our sample or not. 
The figure also contains information on the number of jobseekers at the PES in 
relation to the labour force, i.e., the “jobseeker rate”.
8 Since 1996, disability 
rates have declined somewhat in both the PES and LFS, to 12 and 10 per cent, 
respectively. During the same time the proportion of registered jobseekers has 
fallen dramatically. If incentives to reduce open unemployment bias the PES 
measure, we expect a positive relationship between the unemployment measure 
and the probability of a work disability classification at the PES. The data give 
no clear indication of this; there seems to be a positive relationship after 1998, 
but not before.  The PES-LFS difference, which is the measure we focus on in 
this paper, widens during much of the period 1996–2002. This is suggestive of 
systematic misreporting at the PES offices. However, the tests in Figure 1 are 
not decisive. The PES data in the figure are not a random sample, but consist of 
currently unemployed or jobseeking individuals. Thus compositional effects 
may play a role for the incidence of work disability in the PES, as individuals 
                                                      
6 The following individuals were excluded, in order of exclusion: 1,725 with incorrect or missing 
dates for PES registration; 2,341 below the age of 18 at time of LFS; 2,509 with first PES 
registration before 1991 (the information regarding unemployment history is less reliable for 
individuals registered before 1991); 1,933 with first PES registration later than 2001; 538 with 
disability pension before first PES registration; 148 who emigrated before first PES registration; 
10 with old age pension before first PES registration.   
 
7 It should be noted that 9,919 individuals, out of the 44,532, had at least one spell as either part-
time unemployed or full-time employed looking for a new job, i.e., all their PES spells were not 
spent in open unemployment or programme activity. 
8 The jobseeker rate overstates the total unemployment rate, i.e., open unemployment plus 
participation in labour market programmes, since some of the included individuals are employed 
in regular jobs.     12
with certain health characteristics tend to be more or less likely to enter or 
leave unemployment over the business cycle.
9  
Figure 2 presents cross-sectional data, from our sample. The individuals 
have been aggregated into regions, which differ with respect to the 
unemployment levels. The unemployment measure refers to the total 
unemployment rate, i.e., the sum of open unemployment and participants in 
labour market programmes.
10 The data for municipalities with the same 
unemployment rate have been aggregated and plotted against the average work 
disability rate. There is evidence of a positive relationship between disability 
rates and unemployment in panel a, but mainly for PES disability rates. 
According to the regression lines, estimated by OLS, the relationship is 
significant in 1998 and 2000 for PES (t-ratios 2.2 and 2.6, respectively) and 
nearly significant for LFS in 2000 (t-ratio 1.7).  A similar pattern emerges in 
panel b, which shows the PES-LFS difference. The relationship between 
unemployment and disability rates is positive and significant (t-ratio 2.1). For 
2000, the positive relationship is close to significant (t-ratio 1.4).  
Again, the data in Figure 2 represent but circumstantial evidence. Many 
other factors, besides unemployment, might influence disability rates and 
heterogeneity across regions in this respect is not accounted for in the figure.  
In the econometric section, we will explore in more depth whether the positive 
effect of unemployment on work disability rates, hinted at in the macro-data in 
Figures 1 and 2, survive when confronted with micro-data.  
Sample characteristics are reported in Table 1, which shows disability and 
other characteristics for individuals in our LFS sample, i.e., individuals who at 
some time during 1991–2002 have been registered as jobseekers. On average, 
about 7.9 per cent of the respondents in LFS report a work disability, while 5.5 
and 2.7 per cent classify themselves as partially and highly work disabled, 
respectively.
11 The incidence of overall work disability has been relatively 
                                                      
9 On the one hand, the outflow from employment to unemployment during downturns is expected 
to be relatively larger among the disabled than the non-disabled, which contributes to a positive 
relationship between unemployment and the disability rate. On the other hand, the disabled who 
are out of the labour force may to a greater extent be discouraged from registering at the PES 
offices as unemployed, which is conducive to a negative relationship.    
10 The total unemployment rate in Figure 2 is similar, but not identical, to the jobseeker rate in 
Figure 1, as the latter includes some regularly employed persons looking for a new job. 
11 The levels of the series in the full LFS sample (Figure 1) and our LFS sample (Table 1) are not 
directly comparable, since Statistics Sweden uses a weighting procedure to calculate disability at 




stable over time, while the highly work disabled category has increased 
somewhat across surveys.  
Table 1 also includes data on disability characteristics for a sub-sample of 
individuals with contemporaneous information on work disability in the 
unemployment register. We have constructed a 6-month long “window” – 3 
months before and after a survey, assuming it takes place in the middle of the 
third quarter, i.e., October – which means that the register information dates 
from a point in time that is at most 3 months away from the survey (although 
we experiment with longer time lengths later in the analysis). Such a window is 
available for about half the sample. Individuals recently registered by the PES 
as looking for a job tend to report disability to about the same extent as others 
in the LFS, but the incidence of more severe work disability is somewhat 
higher.
12 In contrast to Figure 1, Table 1 shows that more persons regard 
themselves as work disabled in the LFS than are classified as such at the PES 
(4.7 per cent). This should also be expected as the definition of disability seems 
to be stricter at the PES, something which is obscured in the PES data in Figure 
1 due to the stock sampling of unemployed persons (on October 15 each year). 
Disabled persons are likely to be overrepresented due to this procedure.   
It is also seen in Table 1 that the average number of months of previous 
unemployment increases over subsequent surveys. This may be explained by 
selection effects; the later one is sampled in the LFS, the longer one may have 
been registered as unemployed in the PES data since 1991. Since the 
unemployment rate decreases over the sample period, the later samples contain 
fewer, and presumably less employable, individuals. 
The cross-tabulations of work disability in LFS and PES reveal that 
classifications, by and large, match quite well. About 90 per cent are classified 
in the same way – work disabled or not work disabled – in both sources. 
However, there are discrepancies worth noting. Almost 6 per cent of the 
individuals report a work disability in LFS, while having no such classification 
in PES. A potential explanation, besides changing health between measurement 
dates, is that the definition of work disability used in the unemployment 
register is stricter than the one used by self-reporting individuals. For instance, 
as discussed in Appendix A, it may well be the case that survey respondents 
tend to consider work capacity only in the current or previous job, while PES 
                                                      
12 In the PES data, virtually all non-zero observations on disability are missing values. These 
have been set to zero by us.     14
officials should also take potential future occupations into account. Another 
possibility, however, is that fear of stigmatisation causes jobseekers to decline 
a classification as disabled at the PES, while more anonymity is provided in the 
LFS. Almost 3 per cent declare themselves not to be work disabled, but are 
classified as such in the unemployment register. For this type of discrepancy, it 
is conceivable that intentional misreporting of disability status (in PES) is 
involved, as discussed previously.  
Table 1 also includes some background characteristics of the sample, 
regarding age, gender, education, as well as family and labour market status 
and region of birth. Further details on disability characteristics are presented in 
Appendix B. The table pertains to the window sample and shows a cross-
tabulation of the classification of disability types in the LFS and PES data.  The 
window is extended from 6 to 12 months in order to get more observations in 
the smallest cells. For comparability, some types in LFS had to be lumped 
together (see notes to the table). Motion impairment is the dominating 
disability in both the LFS and the PES. The results in the table support the 




3  Econometric framework  
 
In this section, we put more structure on the problem whether objective, official 
data on disability are reliable. We discuss the possibility of testing if the 
objective classification is distorted by misreporting. To be specific, we consider 
whether the individual’s unemployment history, given health status, affects 
disability classification. This represents a systematic, non-differential 
classification error. We first discuss the framework for PES classification and 
then we proceed to the LFS classification and we conclude with the 
identification and estimation of misreporting, using both classifications. 
 
                                                      
13 The diagonal numbers, shown in bold face, refer to the number of individuals with the same 
classification. This number is in most cases large in relation to the number of individuals with 




3.1  Framework for PES classification 
Let  ) 1 ( D  be the work disability classification at the PES if the individual is 
unemployed and let  ) 0 ( D  be the classification for the same individual if he or 
she is employed. Both variables are dichotomous. The observed work disability 
classification for individual i can then be written as 
 
i i i i i U D D D D )) 0 ( ) 1 ( ( ) 0 ( − + = ,        (1) 
 
where we initially define unemployment as a dichotomous variable: U = 1 if 
the individual is unemployed and U = 0 if he or she is employed.
14 A switching 
regression model, like (1), is a frequently used framework in the literature on 
treatment effects in, e.g., labour market programmes. In analogy with this 
literature, we regard unemployment as the “treatment” and the PES disability 
classification as the outcome of this “treatment”. For individuals with U = 1, 
we observe D(1) and for individuals with U = 0,  D(0) is observed.   
The disability classifications can be thought of as consisting of two 









i D 1 1 ) 1 ( ε β + = .     (2) 
 
As evident in (2), additive separability between the deterministic and stochastic 
parts is assumed. 
The deterministic parts 
d
0 β and 
d
1 β  are the proportions of jobseekers at 
the PES classified as work disabled if unemployed and employed, respectively. 
Both components are assumed to be influenced by the unobserved “true” health 
among jobseekers, but also potentially by their subjective health. Allowing for 
the latter possibility seams reasonable, since the PES officials interact a great 
deal with the jobseekers, usually over a long period of time, and there is a 
regulation that the jobseeker should agree with the classification. It may also be 
the case that the PES official seeks to avoid conflict with the jobseeker, 
especially regarding classification of  self-perceived diseases with vague 
symptoms.  
                                                      
14 Note that jobseekers registered at the PES may be employed.   16
The stochastic parts
d
i 0 ε  and 
d
i 1 ε  represent individual i’s difference (from 
the average of 
d
0 β  and 
d
1 β , respectively) in disability classification at the PES 
in the two states. These components, henceforth denoted “health differences”, 
are similarly assumed to be influenced by both true and subjective health. Thus 
d
i 0 ε  and 
d
i 1 ε  is individual i’s potential health differences if unemployed or 
employed, respectively.  











0 1 β β δ − = 0 ≠  and 
d
i η = 
d
i 1 ε –
d
i 0 ε   0 ≠  represent average and 
individual  state dependence in disability classification, respectively.
15 This 
state dependence may be due to non-health considerations but may also be 
influenced by changes in true health, as unemployment in itself may affect 
health.
16,17 Note that (3) allows for heterogeneous treatment effects. An 
individual with a large 
d
i η is more likely to be classified as work disabled than 
an individual with a low 
d
i η . 
In the absence of an effect of unemployment on true health, 
d δ is the 
average misreporting at the PES. For the moment, it is assumed that there are 
no such effects on true health and we proceed to discussing estimation of 




                                                      
15 We have imposed the super index d because the state-dependent error may differ in the PES 
and LFS disability classifications. In general, however, we would like to think that  i η  is 
independent of the type of measurement. 
16 For evidence regarding effects of own unemployment on health, see, e.g., Björklund (1985), 
Gerdtham and Johannesson (2003) and Hamilton et al. (1997). Regarding health effects of 
economic conditions in general, see, e.g., Ruhm (2000, 2003).       
17 It is worth noting that not even random assignment to unemployment would necessarily 
enhance identification of potential misreporting in this context. Since unemployment may affect 
the individuals’ future health, the probability of being classified as work disabled would be 




3.1.1  Estimation and identification issues 
In this section, we discuss estimation of 
d δ  using register data of PES 
classifications.  
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i i U E U η η ω .  
Equation (4) consists of one observed regressor, Ui , and three unobserved 
components. Note that the last term can be treated as an error, since both 
conditional and unconditional expectation are zero, thus 




i E U E ω ω . This means that if 
d
i 0 ε  and  ) | ( i
d
i U E η  are both 
independent of the sample of unemployed and employed individuals, 
regressing Di on Ui using an OLS estimator of 
d δ provides a simple way to test 
for misclassification.   
It is unlikely that  ) | ( i
d
i U E η  should depend on U. The argument for this 
is that we do not expect individuals to select into unemployment because of 
larger probability to be classified as disabled if unemployed than if employed. 
Still, there is one reason why the OLS estimator is likely to be biased. It is 
highly likely that individuals who have characteristics that increase the 
probability of unemployment, e.g., low education, also have worse health. Thus 
d
i 0 ε  is likely to be larger for the sample of unemployed than for the employed. 
This “endogeneity” problem is likely to produce an upward-biased estimate of 
d δ . 
 
3.2 Framework  for  LFS classification 
In this section, we discuss the self-reported work disability classification. 
Assume that the LFS classification is determined in the same way as the PES 
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where  i S  is the discrete work disability classification. Here, parameters and 
errors with the superscript s correspond to those with superscript d in (3).  
We allow the levels of work disability classification to differ in the LFS 
and the PES; thus it may well be the case that 
d s
0 0 β β ≠ , 
d s
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i U E U S ω ε η δ β + + = + + = 0 0 ) 1 | ( .   (6) 
 
Estimating (6), we encounter the same type of problems as when estimating 
(4).  
 
3.3  Estimation of misreporting using both PES and LFS  
 
We have noted in previous sections that estimating misreporting in the PES and 
LFS separately involves serious problems. In order to identify misclassification 
due to non-health considerations, it is necessary to assume that there is no 
effect of true health on unemployment. This is a highly restrictive assumption. 
Even under this under assumption, we noted that endogeneity problems may 
lead to biased estimates.  
Using both classifications enables us to identify misreporting due to the 
incentives at the PES. However, 
d δ and 
s δ cannot be identified separately.  
Taking the difference between Di and Si, in equations (4) and (6), 
respectively, we get 
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where  , 0 0
s d β β β − = ∆   ) (












i i ω ω ω − = ∆ . 
There are various reasons why S  and D may differ in levels: Different 
thresholds for assessing work capacity reduction (including the possibility of 
more fear of stigmatisation at the PES than in the LFS) and S being classified at 




PES-LFS difference in disability classifications for the population. Thus the 
probabilities to be classified as disabled at the PES and in the LFS may be 
different. The individual probability to be classified as disabled, if employed, 
may differ from the population average  β ∆ , since  i 0 ε ∆  may be non-zero. 
Note that the classification error stemming from different subjective thresholds 
across individuals is differenced out from  i 0 ε ∆ . 
As discussed in Section 2, there may be incentives (both for jobseekers and 
officials) to overreport disability at the PES. These particular incentives should 
not exist in the LFS. Nevertheless 
d δ  and 
s δ may both be distorted due to 
justification, i.e., jobseekers may, for psychological reasons, overreport 
disability in the LFS when unemployed and subjective health may also 
influence PES officials. It is assumed that such justification, if it exists, does 
not influence PES classifications more than reporting in the LFS. Furthermore, 
true health is assumed to have the same effect on both health measures. These 
two assumptions imply that 
d δ  > 
s δ and we interpret  δ ∆  > 0 as misreporting 
due to incentives at the PES. Observe that if self-assessed work disability, like 
the official measure, is affected by justification of unemployment,  δ ∆  does 
not capture the full extent of systematic classification errors due to 
unemployment. In this case, the estimated effect rather represents a lower 
bound of this classification error. 
 
3.3.1  Estimation of misreporting due to incentives at the PES 
From (4) and (6), it is evident that both  i ω ∆  and  ) | ( i i U E η ∆  are mean 
independent of U, i.e., may be treated as regression errors. Thus the key to 
consistently estimate misreporting (due to incentives at the PES) is that  i 0 ε ∆  is 
not systematically different for the employed and unemployed populations. 
i 0 ε ∆  is the individual PES-LFS difference to be classified as disabled if 
employed and it seems unlikely that this should be systematically different in 
the two populations.
18  
                                                      
18 The unemployed have less education and it is, at least theoretically, conceivable that this 
reduces their capacity to assess their own health. In order to account for this possibility, the 
empirical analysis includes background variables such as education and citizenship. 
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How would the estimation be affected if the PES officials were influenced 
solely by true health and not by the jobseekers’ subjective assessment? Assume 
additive separability of the health differences into one (s)ubjective and one 
(t)rue health part, so that  
 




ji ε  and  1 , 0 , = = j t ji
d
ji ε .  
 
If the PES officials’ disability classifications are not influenced by the 
individuals’ own assessment of health in equation (4), equation (7) is equal to 
 
*
0 ) ( i i i
s
i i i i E U s S D ω η δ β ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + − ∆ = ∆ = − . (7’) 
 
It is likely that that the subjective health of the unemployed is worse than the 
subjective health of the employed, thus  ) 1 | ( 0 = U s E
s
i  >  ) 0 | ( 0 = U s E
s
i  and 
this would bias the OLS estimator of  δ ∆  downwards. Thus it will be more 
difficult to detect misreporting at the PES if self-reported health does not 
influence PES classifications. 
As mentioned, the identification strategy builds on the assumption of 
additive separability of the potential disability classification if unemployed and 
employed at the PES and in the LFS (see equation 2). This assumption can of 
course be questioned, especially since D and S are both discrete variables, 
which puts restrictions on the unobserved health differences, 
d
i 0 ε , 
d
i 1 ε , 
s
i 0 ε  
and 
s
i 0 ε . However, since we take the difference between two local 
approximations, the assumption of (local) additive separability is likely to be 
less of a problem in this application than in general.  
We actually have more information on unemployment than just whether the 
individuals are unemployed or not: The length of U in months is observed. 
Thus “treatment” is observed at different “dosage” levels, which yields 
additional testable hypotheses and puts our theory to a stricter test. First, if 
there is a “treatment effect” it should be monotonic, i.e., a larger “dose” of 
unemployment (in months) causes the mean difference between the PES and 
LFS classifications to increase, for all values of unemployment. Arguably, the 
PES officials should have greater incentives to classify the long-term 
unemployed as disabled than those with less joblessness. The observed 
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where  0 β  is the average difference in disability classification if employed,  i ψ  
is by (plausible) assumptions a regression error and  (.) I  is the indicator 
function. From the monotonicity assumption, it follows that k k k ∀ ∆ < ∆ + , 1 δ δ . 
Assuming constant marginal effects, we get  
 
i i U ψ δ β + ∆ + = ∆ 0 .     (9) 
 
Here,  δ ∆  is the average marginal effect of the incentives to exaggerate 
disability at the PES.  
The differencing approach thus offers a clear advantage as it allows us to 
test for misreporting without having to assume that our chosen benchmark – 
self assessed health – is unbiased. This is achieved by using unemployment as 
the identifying “instrument”.  
 
4 Econometric  results 
In the following analyses we use the window sample, i.e., where health 
information in the PES and LFS is recorded within a period of 6 months. 
Unemployment is measured in months and includes participation in labour 
market programmes. The period of measurement is from 1991 up to, but not 
including, the current search category period. We start with a simple bivariate 
analysis, on aggregate as well as individual data. We then go on to estimate the 
misreporting effects on individual data, controlling for various personal 
characteristics.  
In Figure 3, the bivariate relationships between accumulated unemployment 
and disability classifications in the data are presented. Panel a shows a simple 
scatter plot, where the individuals have been classified into groups depending 
on the number of months in unemployment.
19 Panel b is a bivariate regression 
                                                      
19  The individuals in Figure 2.a are classified into K groups, depending on unemployment 
history, according to 
  1 I( ) kk kik Uu aua + =≤ < , k  = 1,…, K, 
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of the same relationships on individual data, with unemployment smoothed 
instead of grouped into intervals and adding the aggregate disability 
classification in the LFS.  
The two panels convey the same message. As expected, a strong positive 
relationship between accumulated unemployment and the probability to be 
classified as work disabled is visible. Obviously, this pattern may be due to 
lower job-finding probabilities among the disabled, but also, as discussed 
previously, state dependence (including adverse effects of unemployment on 
health) or stigmatisation, so we are not identifying any causal effects in the 
figures. However, their most interesting feature is that the probability to be 
classified as work disabled at the PES is increasing more strongly in months of 
unemployment than the corresponding probability in the LFS. This might 
indicate misreporting. It is also noteworthy that the slopes of the partially and 
highly disabled in the LFS do not differ significantly from each other, i.e., the 
individuals are not more likely to self-report a severe, rather than a less severe, 
disability as more unemployment is accumulated. We interpret this as mild 
evidence that unemployment does not contribute disproportionately to more 
severe health problems.  
We now turn to the multivariate regressions. First, separate OLS regressions 
– corresponding to equations (4) and (6) – are run for the probability of being 
classified as work disabled at the PES or in the LFS (either partially or highly), 
respectively. Then regression models of the difference in classifications, i.e., 
equation (9), are estimated. Finally, additive regression models, which leave 
the functional form of the effects from the covariates unspecified, are estimated 
(see e.g. Hastie and Tibshirani, 1990). In addition to unemployment history, 
                                                                                                                                 
where  k u  is accumulated unemployment in class k. The class interval is determined by ak and 
ak+1, where a1 = 0. We calculate the proportion of work disabled in the sample according to the 























== ∑ , k  = 1,…, K.  
The number of classes, K, is 29. Unemployment is, up to 10 months of previous unemployment, 
grouped into intervals of one month. Then, in order to keep the subsamples of reasonable sizes, 
unemployment is grouped into larger intervals; first into two-month intervals, then into five-





variables for age, gender, level of education, number of children, region of 
birth and the year in which the LFS was conducted are included in all models.  
The results from the multivariate OLS estimations are displayed in Table 2. 
Let us first look at the coefficients of the control variables in the separate 
regressions for the PES and LFS. The probability of a disability classification 
increases with age, but at a decreasing rate. Individuals with more education 
are less likely to be classified as work disabled. Family attachments also seem 
to matter; being married or cohabitating and, mainly in the PES data, having 
children are associated with a lower probability of a disability classification. 
These results largely conform to findings in previous studies. Region of birth 
comes out insignificantly in most cases, with some exceptions, notably some 
non-European categories in the LFS. The negative coefficients for those 
individuals may be explained by, e.g., selection  effects (having a disability 
makes migration difficult) or language difficulties.  
What about unemployment, then? An increase in the number of months in 
unemployment is clearly associated with a higher probability to be classified as 
work disabled. The two coefficients – both strongly significant – are 0.0025 
and 0.0013 in the PES and the LFS, respectively. An increase in unemployment 
of, say, 10 months is thus associated with an increase in the likelihood of a 
disability classification with 2.5 percentage points at the PES and 1.3 points in 
the LFS.   
Our most interesting results are provided in the rightmost part of Table 2, 
which shows the regression with the PES-LFS difference in disability 
classifications. Here, the dependent variable takes on the values –1 (the 
individual is classified as work disabled in the LFS, but not at the PES), 0 
(classifications agree) and 1 (no work disability classification in the LFS, but at 
the PES). Many of the coefficients that were significant in the separate 
regressions, e.g., for age, education and children, are now rendered 
insignificant. However, two of the coefficients for foreign-born individuals 
(Europe excluding EU 15 and Asia) remain significant and come out with a 
positive sign, i.e., a disability classification is more likely at the PES than in the 
LFS. Most importantly, unemployment retains strong significance, with a 
coefficient of 0.0012. So an individual with 10 months of previous 
unemployment is about 1 percentage point more likely to be classified as work 
disabled at the PES, but not in the LFS, than if the individual had no previous 
unemployment. This can be compared to the overall probability to be classified 
as work disabled at the PES, which is 5 per cent (see Table 1). Thus, on   24
average, there is a 20 per cent increase in the likelihood of this type of 
classification error with each 10-month increase in unemployment. The 
misreporting we have detected in the data is thus not negligible.  
The results in the PES-LFS regression in Table 2 lend support to the 
hypothesis that there are incentives to exaggerate disability at the PES. We 
argue that a causal interpretation of the relationship between unemployment 
and disability classification is justified here, unlike in the two separate 
regressions. The finding that most controls,  including age, do not significantly 
contribute to explaining the difference in classifications also suggests that 
omitted variable bias is not likely to be a serious problem in our estimations.  
We now turn to the more flexible specification, namely the additive 
regression model.
20 Unlike in the OLS regressions, the functional form of the 
continuous variables is not assumed to be known in advance. So the marginal 
effects of unemployment need not be constant, as assumed in equation (9).  For 
the variables unemployment and age, loess smoothers (locally weighted 
running-line smoother with span 4/3) are used. The presentation of the 
regression results is limited to these two continuous variables and is in visual 
form only. For computational convenience, the relationships between the 
dependent and independent variables are evaluated with all other covariates, 
including the intercept, set to zero.  As a consequence, the probability 
predictions in the figures may, without loss of generality, be negative.  
Figures 4–7 show the additive regression results for PES and LFS 
separately. Figure 4 suggests a linear relationship between unemployment and 
work disability at the PES. A test indicates that linearity cannot be rejected (p-
value 0.44). The relationship between age and work disability at the PES in 
Figure 5 is clearly non-linear (p-value < 0.01), i.e., increasing at first and then 
decreasing at around 50 years of age. The corresponding estimates for self-
assessed work disability in the LFS are presented in Figures 6 and 7. Regarding 
unemployment, the relationship is less linear than in Figure 4. Although there is 
a tendency for a convex shape, linearity cannot be rejected at standard levels 
(p-value 0.054). This is due to the lack of precision at the right end in the 
graph. For age and the LFS classification we now find a consistently positive, 
and close to linear (p-value 0.075), association.  
                                                      
20 The estimation is based on the local scoring algorithm, which iteratively fits weighted additive 
models by backfitting. The backfitting algorithm is a Gauss-Seidel method for fitting additive 




The results for age in the LFS data correspond more to what we expect than 
the findings for age in the PES, since it seems unlikely that health should 
improve as individuals get older. It is conceivable that the PES results are 
explained by the prospect of early retirement for elderly individuals (note that 
no early retirees are included in the sample). This may reduce the need for a 
disability classification at the PES and the associated special measures for the 
disabled, but should not affect LFS classifications.  
Figures 8–10 show the additive regression results for the PES-LFS 
difference in work disability classifications. To begin with, Figure 8 displays a 
simple bivariate regression, where only previous unemployment is regressed on 
the PES-LFS difference. The gradient of unemployment is positive and almost 
linear. There is some concavity after 60 months of unemployment. However, 
the non-linearity is not statistically significant (p-value 0.14).  
Figure 9 corresponds to Figure 8, with the controls added. The effect of 
unemployment on the dependent variable is basically the same as with no 
controls added (linearity is now rejected with an 18 per cent risk). Adding 
controls apparently does little to change the effect of unemployment on the 
PES–LFS difference. As in Table 2, the correlation between unemployment 
and the PES-LFS difference in Figure 9 clearly indicates that there is 
misclassification due to incentives to exaggerate disability at the PES. The 
difference is initially negative if being unemployed for less than 18 months and 
then positive. Under the extreme assumption that the unobserved thresholds
21 
for work disability classification at the PES and in the LFS are the same, all of 
the initial negative effect, up to 18 months of unemployment, is attributable to 
stigmatisation (correlated with unemployment). Under the more realistic 
assumption that the threshold is lower for the self-reported measure than for 
PES classifications, this stigmatisation effect should be very small or absent.
22  
                                                      
21 The average PES-LFS “classification error”, using the overall work disability measure in the 
LFS, is –3.1 per cent = 4.7 – 7.8 per cent (see Table 1). 
22 The average PES-LFS “classification error” using the highly work disabled in the LFS is 2.6 
per cent, according to Table 1. With the stricter LFS disability classification the resulting graph 
looks exactly the same as the one in Figure 9. However, the difference becomes strictly larger 
than zero, so if stigmatisation correlated with unemployment exists it is very low or non-existing 
for this sample.  
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Finally, in Figure 10 the results for age are shown, with controls added. Age 
has a negative impact on the difference around the age of 50 and linearity is 
rejected (p-value < 0.01).   
What about the magnitude of the effects shown in Figures 8–10? An 
individual with 70 months of previous unemployment is about 7 percentage 
points more likely to be classified as work disabled at the PES, but not in the 
LFS, than an individual with no unemployment. The corresponding effect in 
Table 1 is about 8 percentage points, so, in this range of unemployment, the 
difference is not great across estimation methods. The magnitude of the age 
effects is, however, considerably smaller with both regression approaches and 
will not be discussed here.  
We have performed various robustness tests of the PES-LFS difference 
regressions in Table 2 and Figures 9 and 10, the full details of which are 
available from the authors on request. See (i) –  (vi) below. 
(i) Municipal fixed effects were introduced in the regressions. This 
procedure is likely to pick up influences from the local labour market, since 
differences across regions in this respect tend to be permanent over time. The 
results from the fixed effects specification were very similar to previous 
findings.  
(ii) We experimented with increasing the window length from 6 to 12 
months. The number of observations increased to 23,178, but the results 
remained unchanged. 
(iii) Non-Nordic-born individuals were excluded from the sample, in order 
to check whether the results regarding the unemployment effect are explained 
by language difficulties. It is conceivable that some non-Nordic-born do not 
fully understand the interview questions posed in the LFS and thus understate 
true health status, while this is less likely to occur at the PES, where contact is 
repeated and interpreter services may be available. We estimated the model 
excluding the 3,121 individuals born outside of the Nordic countries, but this 
did not change the results. 
(iv) The additive regression results are robust with respect to the choice of 
span width. We have estimated all such models with spans ranging from ½ to 
1½. We have also estimated generalised additive models, with a logit link, for 
the PES and LFS disability classifications (but not for PES-LFS difference). 
The results from these models are in agreement with the findings from the 




(v) It may be the case that individuals condition survey responses on 
previous information from external sources and it was explored whether this 
affects the results. In our case, the responses in the LFS may be influenced by a 
PES classification occurring before the survey. In order to perform this test, it 
was necessary to redefine the sample, creating clear-cut limits between periods 
where the LFS and PES classifications, respectively, may have occurred. We 
thus used a sample of 7,026 individuals who have a spell of unemployment in 
the period 6 months before or after the LFS, but were not unemployed at all 
after or before the LFS. There are 5,191 individuals who have such a spell prior 
to the LFS and who were not unemployed post-LFS and there are 1,835 
individuals who were not unemployed before the LFS but had an 
unemployment spell after the LFS. On this sample, of 7,026 individuals in 
total, an ordered logit regression model using the LFS classification (S = 0,1,2) 
as the dependent variable and the PES classification and a dummy variable for 
a spell prior to the LFS was estimated. The coefficient for the post-LFS dummy 
variable turned out to be insignificant (p-value 0.85), suggesting that 
conditioning of survey responses on official classifications is not a problem in 
our analysis.   
(vi) Experiments were performed with more traditional non-linear models, 
with unemployment grouped into intervals as described in footnote 19. These 






The issue considered in this study is whether objective, official, reports on 
disability status are reliable. While there is a rather large literature on the 
reliability of self-reported disability, evidence regarding objective data is scant. 
It seems to be widely believed among researchers that, since individuals out of 
work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have 
official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies (like the Disability 
Insurance administration or the Public Employment Service).  
The main message of our paper is that administrative data should be 
regarded with some suspicion, even if work capacity is taken into account in 
the data, since the administrators also have incentives to misreport. This is   28
because the PES officials have quantitative targets regarding the placement of 
individuals in subsidised jobs and because the officials may be influenced by 
jobseekers who want to be labelled as disabled. Our findings should shed 
additional light on the distinction between, and usefulness of, subjective and 
more objective health measures as they are defined in the literature. The results 
suggest the presence of incentive problems in disability classification 
procedures at the PES and the sources of error we find are akin to the moral 
hazard effect in social insurance. 
For a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, we have contrasted objective, 
official data with self-reported measures on health status, for the same 
individuals, from the Labour Force Surveys. The econometric analysis shows 
that the difference in the categorical disability classification between the PES 
and the self-reported LFS increases in accumulated unemployment of the 
individual. This result, which indicates misreporting in the official data, is 
robust to various experiments regarding estimation methods, control variables 
and subgroups. We also test whether misreporting increases monotonically in 
the length of “treatment”, e.g., unemployment. 
It should be noted that our definition of misreporting may be different from 
the one that is used internally at the PES. An internal document at the National 
Labour Market Board contains the following passage: “It is only after having 
mapped out and assessed the functional impairment in relation to the labour 
market and the labour supply of the jobseeker that one can determine whether a 
work disability exists” (Ams, 1999, p. 6, our translation and italics). A possible 
interpretation of these guidelines is that using unemployment in order to screen 
for health is permitted. Furthermore, the rules are very clear as regards the right 
of individuals to deny a disability classification, which, in contrast, leads to 
underreporting of impairments according to our definition. Rules and 
guidelines are not created in a vacuum, though, and may well be influenced by 
the incentive structures that we have discussed. 
Unlike many other validation studies of economic data, we are not able to 
assess the magnitude of the error we find in the variable under consideration.  
This is due to our assumption that subjective health may be flawed in several 
respects, but that the difference in disability classifications should be 
independent of unemployment if there is no misreporting due to incentives to 
exaggerate disability at the PES. It is worth noting that, due to state 
dependence, our estimates rather are more likely to provide a lower bound of 




work disability, like the official measure, is (positively) correlated with 
unemployment given true health status, the effect of unemployment on PES 
disability classifications will be underestimated.  
Although we use an objective, official measure of disability which is 
unusual in the literature and possibly not readily available in other countries, 
we believe that our results should have implications also for the validity of 
other official measures. If these measures are also influenced by the incentives 
of the persons making the classifications and the incentives of the individuals 
being classified, the validity of the measures should not be taken for granted. 
Institutional details of the classification procedures and empirical evidence 
supporting the validity need to be considered as well.   
Our framework of analysis should be suitable also for studying the impact 
of various policy shifts, regarding, e.g., the generosity of benefits or screening 
procedures, in labour market programmes for the disabled. Do classification 
errors of the type we have considered here become more or less prevalent as a 
consequence of such shifts? To this and other related issues we intend to return 
in future research.  
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Disability data in the HÄNDEL events database (PES) and in the Labour 
Force Surveys (LFS) 
 
 
In the PES data, disabilities are classified into eight different categories: Heart 
and/or lung disease, hearing, vision or motion impairment, other somatic 
disabilities (including allergy, diabetes and stomach and intestinal diseases), 
and psychic, intellectual and socio-medicinal disabilities, the latter of which 
includes substance abuse. If an individual has more than one disability, only the 
main one is recorded, so it is not observed whether there are multiple 
disabilities.  
In the LFS, there are questions concerning functional impairment, which is 
defined (and read aloud to the respondents) as “a physical, medical or psychic 
impairment, which may cause restrictions in daily life. The impairment may be 
congenital or developed later in life through sickness, accident or occupational 
injury. Examples of functional impairments are vision or hearing impairments, 
speech or voice disorders, motion impairment, allergy or other form of psychic 
impairments. It can also be dyslexia, epilepsy, diabetes, heart- and lung 
problems, and stomach and intestinal disease.” The respondents are asked 
whether they have a functional impairment according to this definition.  
If the answer is yes, there is follow-up question concerning the type of 
impairment. There are 16 categories (plus an open-ended alternative): 
Asthma/allergy or other type of hypersensitivity; DAMP/ADHD 
(neuropsychiatric children’s diseases); diabetes; dyslexia; deafness; epilepsy; 
heart disease or vascular disorder; hearing impairment; stomach or intestinal 
disease; lung disease; psoriasis; psychic impairment; mental retardation; 
motion impairment; stammering, speech or voice disorders; and vision 
impairment/blindness. The respondents may choose more than one alternative 
from the list and are also asked whether they regard any one of them as the 
main impairment.  
Those who have responded in the affirmative to the introductory question in 
the LFS and have also reported at least one impairment are requested to answer 




work and not at home. In your opinion, do(es) your functional impairment(s) 
reduce your work capacity?” The interviewees may reply “Yes, highly so”, 
“Yes, partially so”, “No, not at all” or “Do not know”. The latter alternative is 
applicable for the unemployed or for persons who have not entered the labour 
market. The interviewers are instructed that the respondents themselves should 
decide what is meant by “much” and by “partly”. Only one answer, applying to 
all impairments, is reported. To the extent that “Yes, much so” is given as an 
answer for one impairment and “Yes, partly” for another, the former alternative 
is reported. In addition, there are some questions intended for employed 
respondents only. These questions deal, inter alia, with the need for special 
aids, work tools or assistants at the workplace and whether such supportive 
measures have been undertaken.  
We have no information on whether the disabilities are considered to be 
permanent in the self-reported data (although some of the impairments listed 
tend to be of a lasting nature, e.g., hearing impairment, epilepsy and mental 
retardation). Moreover, it is quite possible that respondents define the reduction 
of work capacity only in relation to a current and/or previous job and do not 
recognise the potential to adjust, with proper training and rehabilitation, to a 
new job. There are no questions concerning applications, rejections or awards 
of disability benefits in the LFS, nor in the PES data.  
Respondents in the LFS are guaranteed a high degree of anonymity. 
According to the Secrecy Act (Sekretesslagen), strict confidentiality applies to 
information given by respondents in statistical surveys performed by the 
Government.     36
Appendix B 
Table B: Sample characteristics. Cross-tabulations of types of work disability 
among individuals with contemporaneous information on work disability in the 
supplementary Labour Force Surveys (LFS) and in the unemployment register 
(PES). Number of individuals. 
PES  None  A D HL  H V M OS  P I  OT  All 
LFS      
 None  20,775  2  3  15 22 10 227  126  64 34 80 21,358 
 A  257  0 1 3 0 0 6 43  0 0 2 312 
 D  23  0  2 0 1 0 0 6    1 2 0 36 
 HL  39  0  0  10  0 0 3 5 0 0 0 57 
 H  59  0  0  0  12  0 0 1 1 0 2 74   
  V  34  0 0 0 0 6 2 2 0 0 0 40     
  M  497  0 0 3 2 0 205  18  8 3 5 741 
  OS 101  0 0 2 1 0 10  17  1 2 1 135 
  P  65  0 1 0 0 0 3 3 15 0  3  90 
  I  6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 
  OT 197  0 0 0 0 0 54  22  1 0 2 276 
  NS 33  0 0 1 1 0 12  5 0 0 1 53 
  
All  22,086  2  7  35 39 16 520  246  90 41 96 23,178 
Note:   A = Asthma /allergy (PES) = Asthma/allergy (LFS)  
  D = Dyslexia (PES) = Dyslexia (LFS). 
  HL = Heart/and or lung disease (PES) = Heart disease/vascular disease + Lung disease (LFS).  
  H = Hearing impairment (PES) = Deafness + Hearing impairment (LFS).    
  V= Vision impairment (PES) = Vision impairment, blindness (LFS). 
  M = Motion impairment (PES) = Motion impairment (LFS).       
OS = Other somatic disabilities (PES) = Diabetes + Epilepsy + Stomach or intestinal disease 
   + Psoriasis + Stammering, speech and voice disorders (LFS).  
P = Psychic disability (PES) = Psychic disability + DAMP/ADHD (LFS). 
I = Intellectual disability (PES) = Mental retardation (LFS). 
OT = Sociomedicinal disability (PES) = Other (LFS).     
NS = Multiple disabilities, main one not stated (LFS only)  
Disabilities of individuals in the LFS who have multiple disabilities and have reported a main 

































































Figure 1: Work disability rates, at the PES and in the LFS, and the jobseeker 
rate at the PES, 1992–2002. Aggregate data from the PES and the LFS. 
 
Note: The jobseeker rate is measured as the number of registered individuals looking for a job 
over the labour force. The proportion of registered (and disabled) individuals at the PES refers to 
October 15 each year.     38
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Figure 2: Work disability rates, at the PES and in the LFS, and the local 
unemployment rate, in 1996, 1998 and 2000. Aggregate data from the PES 






Table 1: Sample characteristics. Individuals in the supplementary Labour 
Force Surveys (LFS) 1996, 1998 and 2000. Means.
  
Characteristics        All  years  1996  1998  2000 
Disability characteristics: 
At all disabled            0.161    0.148  0.144   0.193  
Work  disabled           0.079        0.079  0.081    0.077 
Partially               0.055  0.059  0.056   0.050 
Highly           0.027    0.023  0.028    0.029 
Subsample with contemporaneous information on work   
disability in unemployment register (PES)*      0.477   0.618    0.496 0.314 
of which: 
Work disabled (LFS)          0.078    0.079    0.078  0.079 
Partially        0.058    0.061    0.055  0.055 
Highly        0.021    0.018    0.023  0.024 
Work disabled (PES)          0.047    0.046    0.050  0.046 
Work disabled (LFS) + Work disabled (PES)  0.022   0.021    0.022  0.023 
Work disabled (LFS) + Not work disabled (PES)  0.057   0.058    0.056  0.056 
Not work disabled (LFS) + Work disabled (PES)    0.025  0.025    0.027   0.022 
Not work disabled (LFS) + Not work disabled (PES)  0.896  0.896  0.895  0.899 
Months of previous unemployment (PES)      14.95  11.43    15.82   20.37 
Other characteristics: 
Age         34.92    34.22  34.85  35.70 
Female         0.515    0.513  0.514  0.518 
Education: 
  Primary              0.244   0.263 0.245 0.223 
  Upper  secondary        0.517    0.523  0.518  0.510 
  University        0.231    0.205  0.228  0.260 
Family status: 
  Married  or  cohabitating        0.606   0.585 0.604 0.627 
  No.  of  children          0.794    0.778  0.783  0.823 
Labour market status: 
  Employed        0.692    0.637  0.684  0.756 
  Unemployed            0.085   0.121 0.079 0.053 
  Out of labour force          0.224    0.242  0.237  0.191 
Region of birth:  
 Sweden  0.857  0.857  0.858  0.856 
  Finland, Denmark and Norway   0.032  0.036  0.029  0.030 
  EU 15 (excluding the Nordic countries)  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001 
  Europe excluding EU 15  0.037  0.036  0.037  0.038 
  Africa  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
 North  America  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  South  America    0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  Asia  0.043  0.040 0.043 0.045 
  Oceania  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Former  USSR  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N  44,532  15,089 14,802 14,641   
Note:* Information available within a period of 3 months before and after a Labour Force Survey.   40
Table 2: Regressions of PES, LFS and the difference in PES and LFS work 
disability classifications (Diff.). OLS. N= 21,249.   
 PES LFS  Diff. 
Variable/parameter  coefficient  | t-ratio |  coefficient  | t-ratio |  coefficient  | t-ratio | 
Intercept  -0.0867 4.03  -0.0298  1.12  -0.0568  2.01 
Unemployment  0.0025 22.59  0.0013  11.59 0.0012 9.15 
Age  0.0067 6.26 0.0046  3.44  0.0020  1.36 
Age squared x 100  -0.0068 4.89  -0.0032  1.81  -0.0036  1.83 
Year of Labour Force Survey. Reference category: 1996 
1998  -0.0074 2.30  -0.0040  0.97  -0.0033  0.75 
2000  -0.0223 6.00  -0.0108  2.26  -0.0115  2.25 
Education. Reference category: unknown education 
Primary  -0.0068 0.49  -0.0046  0.28  -0.0022  0.13 
Upper  -0.0247 1.78  -0.0193  1.17  -0.0053  0.33 
University  -0.0545 3.91  -0.0551  3.30  0.0006  0.04 
Family status. Reference categories: not married nor cohabiting, male and no children 
Married or 
cohabiting 
-0.0154 4.13  -0.0081  1.75  -0.0073  1.50 
Female  0.0043 1.49 0.0086  2.27  -0.0043  1.05 
1 child  -0.0101 1.97  -0.0041  0.63  -0.0060  0.88 
2 children  -0.0117 2.23  -0.0053  0.81  -0.0065  0.94 
3 children  -0.0179 2.60  -0.0090  1.03  -0.0089  0.94 
≥ 4 children  -0.0001 0.01 0.0272  1.82  -0.0273  1.73 
Region of birth. Reference category: Sweden 
Finland, Denmark 
and Norway  
0.0038 0.38 0.0131  1.03  -0.0093  0.71 
EU 15 (excluding  
Nordic countries) 
0.0135 0.74 0.0124  0.55  0.0011  0.05 
Europe (excluding 
EU 15) 
0.0025 0.33  -0.0293  3.69  0.0319  3.40 
Africa  -0.0262 2.24  -0.0409  3.03  0.0147  1.07 
North America  -0.0203 0.75  -0.0245  0.81  0.0042  0.10 
South America   -0.0123 0.91  -0.0067  0.37  -0.0056  0.28 
Asia  0.0026 0.34  -0.0243  3.14  0.0269  3.02 
Oceania  0.0764 0.68  -0.0699  3.64  0.1465  1.23 
Former USSR  -0.0152 0.39  -0.0006  0.01  -0.0145  0.39 
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Probability of work disabability (smoothed)
 
b) 
Figure 3: The relationship between previous months of unemployment and the 
proportion of work disabled at the PES and LFS: a) Scatter plot and b) 
estimate by bivariate local regression (loess) smoothing using one degree 
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3 Probability of work disability: PES
 
Figure 4: The estimated relationship between previous months of 
unemployment and PES work disability classification (95 per cent confidence 
interval).  
 
Note: Multivariate regression based on the additive model with a one polynomial loess smoother 
with span ¾ and symmetric distribution.  



















Probability of work disability: PES 
 
Figure 5: The estimated relationship between age and PES work disability 
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Probability of work disability: LFS
 
Figure 6: The estimated relationship between previous months of 
unemployment and LFS work disability classification (both partially and highly 
disabled, 95 per cent confidence interval).  
 
Note: The LFS data refer to both partially and highly disabled. See also note to Figure 4.  
 































8 Probability of work disability: LFS
 
Figure 7: The estimated relationship between age and LFS work disability 
classification (95 per cent confidence interval). See also notes to Figures 4 and 
6. 
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PES -LFS difference in probability of work disability
 
Figure 8: The estimated effect of previous months of unemployment on the 
PES-LFS difference in work disability classification (95 per cent confidence 
interval). Bivariate regression. 
 
Note: Regression based on the additive model with a one polynomial loess smoother with span ¾ 
and symmetric distribution. See also note to Figure 6. 
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PES-LFS difference in probability of work disability 
 
Figure 9: The estimated effect of previous months of unemployment on the 
PES-LFS difference in work disability classification (95 per cent confidence 

























PES -LFS difference in probability of work disability
 
Figure 10: The estimated effect of age on the PES-LFS difference in work 
disability classification (95 per cent confidence interval). See also notes to 
Figures 4 and 6. 
 